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Abstract 
We propose a two-dimensional audit rotation framework on auditors’ rotation that contributes to 
the discussion on the potential impact of alternatives to strengthen and maintain unbiased attitude, 
objectivity, and independence. According to the conceptual outlines of this framework, auditors’ 
objectivity and independence might be enhanced by dealing with confirmation bias and motivated 
reasoning bias. In this study, we outline and propose potential academic inquiries that could be 
addressed and tested under this framework. We draw upon research on accounting, auditing, 
psychology, and economics to discuss the potential consequences of different audit rotation 
alternates on auditors’ objectivity and independency. A framework is proposed with two-
dimensional effects: confirmation bias and motivated reasoning bias. The research implications of 
the framework indicate that, to varying degrees, various audit rotation arrangement alternatives to 
the current partner-only rotation mandate in the U.S. could potentially enhance auditors’ 
objectivity and independency by mitigating confirmation bias and motivated reasoning bias, thus 
producing more objective and independent audit opinions. This study fills the void in the literature 
by providing a two-dimensional framework to the current literature of audit rotation for 
categorizing and comparing different audit rotation alternatives. The framework also enables us to 
shed light on the relative efficacy of different rotation arrangements on auditors’ objectivity and 
independence. 
Keywords: audit rotation, confirmation bias, motivated reasoning bias, firm rotation, accounting 
research, auditing research, objectivity, independence 
Introduction 
Independence is one of the most important characteristics of auditing profession. External auditors 
are hired to provide an unbiased and objective assurance on the truthfulness and accuracy of an 
entity’s financial reports. In addition, auditors are required to express their opinion on 
management’s assertions about the effectiveness of internal control for issuers. Both academic and 
applied research have argued auditors’ independence as being one of the fundamental reasons for 
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 the existence of external auditing because services performed by external auditors somewhat 
equate to the services of firm’s internal auditors (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2006). 
Failure to issue objective opinion on financial reporting at Enron, WorldCom, Qwest, Adelphia, 
Tyco and so on, in the early 2000s has led critics to blame the auditors for potential negligence 
and corruption. 
This theoretical exploration proposes a two-dimensional audit rotation model that can enhance 
auditors’ objectivity and independence. In this model, we propose that one dimension clearly 
reflects auditors’ potential susceptibility to confirmation bias. The other dimension is identified 
with auditor’s susceptibility for motivated reasoning bias. The resulting quadrant creates an 
organizational framework that outlines the classification (a total of four categories) of the currently 
existing and possible future framework of audit rotation arrangements.  
The final framework comprising four quadrants in the proposed model facilitate the categorization 
of the four existing and proposed audit rotation arrangements, and discusses the potential 
implications of these arrangements on auditors’ objectivity and independence. 
Prior research (Bazerman, Moore, Tetlock, & Tanlu, 2006; Bhattacharjee, Maletta, & Moreno, 
2007; Moore et al., 2006) indicates existence of some cognitive, social, and institutional attributes 
in the current auditing structure. Those attributes can influence auditors’ decisions without them 
realizing that conflicts of interest might occur without their conscious intention to indulge in 
corruption. The three threats to independence present in the current auditing system include 
managers hiring and firing auditors, auditors siding with clients’ financial and other narratives, 
and auditors providing non-audit services to the client (Moore et al., 2006). As such, auditors who 
are susceptible to motivated reasoning bias are prompted to exploit ambiguity in reporting 
standards and align their judgments and decisions with the management’s preference (Kadous, 
Kennedy, & Peecher, 2003; Kunda, 1990).  
In addition to motivated reasoning bias noted above, we also argue that in some instances, auditors 
may act in a biased manner with existing clients resorting to prior evidence, judgments, and 
opinions. This type of bias is further reinforced by the tendency of returning auditors to either 
repeatedly search for confirming evidence or interpret the ambiguous evidence in favor of prior 
opinions issued rather than react to small but important changes entailed by new evidence. In social 
psychology, the propensity of individuals to preferentially select and overweight evidence 
confirming previous knowledge is known as confirmation bias (Klayman, 1995; Rabin & Schrag, 
1999). Furthermore, under certain circumstances, when people generally find confirmation of their 
prior hypotheses to be rewarding (for example, if the previously accepted accounting treatment 
coincides with the client’s preference), they will tend to adopt behaviors that produce more of the 
same outcomes (Klayman, 1995). This type of behavior leads to further erosion and impairment 
of objectivity and independence in audit engagements.  
The sequential nature of audit engagements and eventuality of audit opinions is an important 
feature in practice, but most of the previous research has considered only the sequential nature of 
individual audit tasks (e.g., Ashton & Ashton, 1988; Bhattacharjee et al., 2007; Cushing & 
Loebbecke, 1986; Gibbins, 1984;). To date, only a few studies (Jeffrey, 1992; Tan, 1995) have 
focused on the fact that audit engagements themselves are sequential; most auditors are involved 
in repeat engagements and the same auditors participate in the audit of the same clients year after 
year. Tan (1995) investigates how audit decision process is affected by the conclusion recorded in 
prior years’ working paper and reveals that the expectations formed ahead of evaluation of 
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 evidence that are either positive or negative significantly affect the judgments on a going-concern 
task. Similarly, in a study regarding audit of bank loans, Jeffrey (1992) finds that personal 
involvement in sequential loan evaluations encourages the auditor to make a judgment of loan 
collectability that is consistent with their previous judgment.  
The proposed model utilizes existing four-dimensional audit rotation arrangements that have been 
traditionally practiced in the U.S. Our study also addresses the ever-present issues of auditors’ 
objectivity and independence. Thus, we present different approaches of directly addressing 
confirmation and motivated reasoning biases under alternative audit arrangements. The four-
dimensional model proposed in this study incorporates traditional partner-only rotation approach. 
We also propose three additional rotation alternatives developed by utilizing models from prior 
research published by various practitioners, regulators, and academic scholars. Our proposed 
model comprises: a) partner-only rotation (mandatory after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
[SOX] of 2002); b) mandatory staff rotation (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
[AICPA] Cohen Commission, 1978; Nelson, 2006); c) mandatory firm rotation without a fixed-
period contract (Bazerman, Morgan, & Loewenstein, 1997; Orin, 2008); and d) mandatory firm 
rotation with a fixed-period contract (Bazerman et al., 2006; Moore et al., 2006).  
As it appears, this academic research is the first of its kind that systematically addresses, in a single 
study, the implications of confirmation bias and motivated reasoning bias on the objectivity and 
independence of audit judgment under the context of various audit rotation arrangements. 
Specifically, we argue that the typical sequential auditing nature and economic pressure to keep 
the client as characterized in the current auditing environment might have placed auditors under 
the influence of confirmation bias and motivated reasoning bias without them consciously 
realizing the negative impacts that may occur. The proposed audit rotation reforms, to varying 
degrees, have the potential to meliorate the problems associated with the two biases.  
More specifically, through the lens of the proposed framework, academic literature seems to 
indicate that auditors working under the current partner-only rotation arrangement, who use their 
own prior working papers in repeat engagements, are susceptible to both confirmation bias and 
motivated reasoning bias in the latter years of audit. Staff rotation arrangement alleviates but does 
not eliminate the influence of the confirmation bias when subsequent auditors inherit working 
papers generated by their peer auditors within the same firm. In contrast, it is suggested that 
auditors under the firm rotation arrangement could make more objective judgments without the 
influence of previously held propositions, albeit they still bear the pressure to keep the client. Firm 
rotation with a fixed-period contract arrangement can further meliorate the client’s influence. 
Consequently, the model suggests that a combination of firm rotation with a fixed-period contract, 
by muting both confirmation bias and motivated reasoning bias, could potentially produce the most 
objective and independent audit opinions. 
Background of Audit Rotation 
Periodic rotation of audit partners has been introduced in many jurisdictions around the world. 
Firms either initiate auditors’ rotations on their own or are mandatorily required to do so. In the 
U.S., SOX 2002 requires the external lead and concurring audit partners to rotate after five years. 
Consequently, lead partners would be subject to a five-year time-out or cool-off period upon 
rotating out (Section 203). The subject of audit partner rotation has received wide attention from 
researchers worldwide. However, the efficacy of audit partner rotation has received mixed reviews. 
For example, utilizing relevant data from Australia, Carey and Simnett (2006) discovered that long 
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 partner tenure observations are associated with few occurrences of issuing a going-concern opinion 
and increased occurrences of just beating (missing) earnings benchmarks. This precedent supports 
the notion that long audit partner tenure deteriorates audit quality. Likewise, in a more recent study, 
supporting partner rotation, Lennox, Wu, and Zhang (2014) document a significantly higher 
frequency of audit adjustments during the departing partner's final year of tenure and during the 
incoming partner’s first year of tenure. However, contrary to the concern leading to the partner 
rotation mandate, some studies show that longer partner tenure appears to improve audit quality 
(Cahan & Sun, 2015; Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002; Manry, Mock, & Turner, 2008). Still, there 
are other studies providing results that do not support or dispute the relationship between auditor 
tenure and audit quality (i.e., Knechel & Vanstraelen, 2007). 
Although the effectiveness of the mandatory partner rotation remains uncertain, some researchers 
have concluded that to truly reinforce the independence of the public accountants, SOX should 
either be expanded to mandate rotation of audit personnel and partners instead (AICPA Cohen 
Commission, 1978) or require audit firm rotation (Orin, 2008; U.S. General Accounting Office, 
2003; U.S. Senate, 1976; Zeff, 2003). Others (Moore et al., 2006) advocate fixing the hiring of an 
audit firm for a certain period in an effort to alleviate a firm’s pressure of keeping clients—a 
starting point of conflict of interest that is referred to as firm rotation with a fixed-period.  
However, critics of extended rotation allege that audit failure rate is much higher in the early years 
of audit relationship due to the lack of client-specific information and experience with the clients 
(George, 2004). Further, in countries where audit firm rotation has been adopted and subsequently 
dropped, such rotation improves the perception of independence and objectivity but is detrimental 
to the audit quality (Cameran, Merlotti, & Di Vincenzo, 2005).  
Despite its importance and potential contribution to the current debate, very few studies have 
provided a framework to help standard setters and researchers to assess the relative benefits and 
costs of different audit rotation options. This study aims to fill this void and proposes a theoretical 
framework to shed light on the question about how the different proposed audit rotation initiatives 
impact auditors’ objectivity and independence. In addition, specific research opportunities are 
suggested for future studies in this area. 
Audit Rotation Framework 
Focusing on individual auditors, we provide a two-dimensional framework (see Figure 1 and Table 
1). One dimension represents the degree to which auditors are susceptible to confirmation bias. 
The other dimension is the degree to which auditors are susceptible to motivated reasoning bias. 
Each possible types of bias will be discussed further below. The four existing and proposed audit 
rotation possibilities are presented in Figure 1 according to the two dimensions. As shown in the 
upper quadrants of Figure 1, starting from the right (left), auditors under the current partner-only 
rotation (firm rotation) are presumably subject to confirmation bias to the greatest (least) extent. 
Moreover, among the four initiatives, only one audit arrangement crosses into the lower quadrant 
(firm rotation with a fixed-period contract) as it is posited to reduce motivated reasoning bias. The 
predominance of the upper quadrant suggests that most of the current and proposed audit rotation 
options fail to provide a mechanism mitigating the effect caused by motivated reasoning bias.  
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Figure 1. Audit rotation framework. 
Table 1. Framework to Predict the Effect of Various Audit Rotation Arrangements on Auditors’ 
Objectivity and Independence 
Bias 1. Partner-Only 2. Staff Rotation 3. Firm Rotation without Contract 
4. Firm Rotation with 
Contract 
Confirmation Strong Presence Weak Presence Absence Absence 
Motivated 
Reasoning Strong Presence Strong Presence Strong Presence Week Presence 
Objectivity and 
Independence Lowest Lower Higher Highest 
Our research implications of the framework advocate that different audit rotation arrangements 
will have different implications on auditors’ susceptibility to the two biases, and further, on their 
professional objectivity and independence. Auditors under the current rotation mandate are 
unlikely to overcome confirmation bias and motivated reasoning bias. Instead, the other proposed 
audit rotation arrangements have the potential to alleviate the two biases to varying degrees. 
Particularly, staff auditors under the current partner-only rotation policy continue to use their own 
self-generated working papers in the following years and are likely to be susceptible to client-
preferred accounting and auditing treatments (referred to as partner-only). Staff rotation 
arrangement alleviates but not eliminates the influence of the confirmation bias when subsequent 
auditors inherit working papers generated by their colleagues within the same firm (referred to as 
staff rotation). In contrast, the auditors under the firm rotation arrangement should be able to make 
increasingly objective judgments without the influence of confirmation bias as they start a new 
audit assignment (referred to as firm rotation without contract). However, these auditors are also 
exposed to motivated reasoning bias. The combination of firm rotation and fixed-period 
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 arrangement, by muting both confirmation and motivated reasoning biases, is predicted to produce 
the most objective and independent audit opinion (referred to as firm rotation with contract).  
It is important to stress that consistent with the decomposition of the independence by Farmer, 
Rittenberg, and Trompeter (1987), the objectivity in this study represents independent mental 
attitude and is identified as a psychological component of audit independence. In general, auditors 
are considered objective and independent if they can firmly hold their opinion against the 
management’s desires and preferences of the audit outcome. Aside from the implication of auditor 
rotation on objectivity and independence, it has also been acknowledged that enhanced objectivity 
and independence may not necessarily lead to higher audit quality, especially for a firm with 
specific industry practice. However, the focus of this study is on objectivity and independence, 
leaving issues pursuant to other implications of audit rotation for future research. 
Confirmation Bias  
The confirmation bias theory suggests that people have a cognitive bias that leads them to 
misinterpret new information as supporting previously held hypotheses, which further induces 
overconfidence on their previous beliefs (Rabin & Schrag, 1999). In an even worse situation, once 
a strong hypothesis is formed, people simply stop being attentive to relevant new information that 
contradicts or supports their hypotheses, which is also called anchoring effect. To illustrate, when 
investors are convinced that one stock is more lucrative than another, they may simply shut down 
to more opportunities or information to help them become better informed. However, in an 
auditing setup, auditors do not have the option to stop collecting evidence; thus, this effect is not 
in the interest of the current study. The most striking evidence for such confirmation bias is a series 
of experiments demonstrating how providing the same ambiguous information to people who 
differ in their initial beliefs on some topics can move their beliefs farther apart. A plethora of 
psychological research has documented the persuasiveness of this confirmation bias and its 
consequences. According to these studies, first, humans are generally prone to confirmation bias, 
under the influence of which people selectively favor evidence supportive of the persistent belief 
and scrutinize evidence against it. Second, when people suffer from confirmation bias, further 
collection of evidence with mixed signals can only exacerbate the bias by the biased interpretation 
of evidence, leading to near certainty in the current hypotheses, a phenomenon called 
overconfidence. Related to this, a study done as early as 1951 on stereotype formation by Wyatt 
and Campbell (1951) explicitly states that “experience per se without reality-testing or verification 
may often be a liability, bringing reduced objectivity” (p. 499). Moreover, Perkins (1981) citing 
Wyatt and Campbell’s study (1951), points out that fresh thinkers may be better at seeing solution 
to problems, because they are not overwhelmed by the interference of old hypotheses. 
According to Rabin and Schrag (1999), confirmation bias and overconfidence arise when people 
must interpret ambiguous evidence; when people must interpret statistical evidence to assess the 
correlation between phenomena that are separated by time; or when people selectively collect or 
scrutinize evidence. Since these variations of circumstances are quite common in auditing 
environment, therefore, not surprisingly, confirmation bias in auditing systems can produce 
unintended outcomes on evaluation of evidence (Birnberg & Shield, 1984; Libby, 1981). 
Earlier, audit-judgment research focusing on the influence of confirmation bias generated mixed 
results with respect to the predicted presence of confirmation bias in audit environment. For 
example, Kida (1984) examined whether auditors who were assigned to either a failure- or 
viability-hypothesis condition would attend to more confirmation evidence, disconfirmatory 
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 evidence, or equal amounts of both when testing a hypothesis with regard to the viability of the 
client firm. The results did not provide strong support for confirmation bias. Similarly, Trotman 
and Sng (1989) wrote on auditors’ information search strategy in sequential judgment processes 
and in the presence of cue-diagnostic information. The results again provided very little support 
for confirmation bias. Auditor subjects in both studies engaged in conservative strategy in 
judgment making process. However, we consider three experimental characteristics in prior studies 
that may contribute to the failure to find support for confirmation bias. First, the subjects in the 
task were given a hypothesis without knowing the source of the hypothesis. This approach, in 
practice, is very important when auditors evaluate subsequent evidence (Bamber, 1983; Cohen & 
Kida, 1989; Joyce & Biddle, 1981). Second, there was no control group in these two prior studies. 
As a result, it is hard to understand what information auditors attended to without the previously 
formed hypothesis. Lastly, the implications for auditors of poor audit judgment in the going-
concern task tested in the two studies are potentially very substantial (e.g., legal liability), resulting 
in the overarching conservatism effect.  
More recently, Tan (1995) amended the first issue identified by asking the self-generated audit 
group to actually provide prior judgment and inherited group to use prior judgment on a going-
concern task. His results confirmed the existence of confirmation bias on memory recall but not 
on the audit judgment. In addition, studying an audit of bank loans, Jeffrey (1992) found that 
personal involvement in sequential loan evaluations encourages auditors to make a judgment of 
loan collectability that is consistent with their previous judgment. Taken together, evidence 
supporting confirmation bias started to emerge in the literature. This study advocates for future 
research to use a more common assignment that incorporates a specific auditing contextual features 
wherein auditors clearly know the source of evidence and all possible audit rotation arrangements 
are represented. This kind of academic investigation would complement prior research on the 
effectiveness of audit rotation initiatives.  
Psychology research repeatedly confirmed that individuals engaged in generating their own 
hypotheses are more likely to search for confirming evidence and to measure information cures in 
a manner that supports their hypotheses (Klayman, 1995). Accordingly, auditors who are assigned 
to the same engagement or the same client year after year are particularly susceptible to 
confirmation bias. This is so because audit opinions formed in the early years of engagement 
through evidence collection and observation will gradually become salient, and as a result, will 
work as an inhibitor to auditors’ ability to overturn the molded beliefs even after the situations 
surrounding the engagement have changed. By contrast, the negativities associated with 
confirmation bias and further overconfidence will be less severe if auditors are required to rotate 
off the current repeating engagement periodically. Research has shown that asymmetries exist 
between self-perception and perception to others. In particular, people make more dispositional 
inferences about others than about themselves (Jones & Nisbett, 1972) and see others as more 
vulnerable to cognitive and motivated reasoning biases (Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004). 
Therefore, successive auditors who are newly assigned to a client are less committed to others’ 
beliefs than to their own beliefs. As a result, they would be less susceptible to conformation bias 
and less likely to succumb to the previously formed opinions. Therefore, future research can 
investigate – Research Question 1: Would audit judgments be more objective and independent 
under staff rotation arrangement than under the current partner-only rotation mandate? (see 
Figure 1 and Table 1) 
Although auditors’ rotation arrangement could potentially alleviate the influence of confirmation 
bias, yet auditors are not expected to be immune from some sort of bias. Especially when 
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 subsequent auditors inherit working papers generated by their peer auditors within the same firm. 
The successive auditors may still commit to the inherited hypothesis since the credibility of the 
previous hypothesis source is high (Smith & Kida, 1991). Earlier research finds that a particular 
source of information may also contribute in explaining why people behave differently in search 
and measurement of evidence when given the same hypotheses (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Petty & 
Wegerner, 1998). It is reasonable to state that when auditors are equipped with working papers 
from their colleagues of the same peer firm, their subsequent auditing work will more likely to be 
preoccupied by the professionally documented procedures or findings. Consistently, prior research 
suggests that auditors with access to the complete set of working papers are more likely to assume 
conclusions reached in previous years are generally good predictors of current year’s findings 
(Kreutzfeldt & Wallace, 1986).  
However, those auditors who inherit prior-year working papers for new clients under mandatory 
rotation requirements face different predicament. Researchers argue that new firm may not make 
the same pledges with respect to prior opinions issued. After a company employs a new auditing 
firm, it would have both a financial and legal incentive to disclose or correct, rather than confirm, 
any inappropriate accounting treatments inherited from a predecessor firm (Orin, 2008). In 
addition, the unavailability of the prior-year working papers provides less opportunity for 
confirmation bias to affect auditors because they need to gather their own evidence and form their 
own opinions toward the new client. Therefore, auditors who take over the client for the first time 
are less likely to be influenced by a simple opinion rendered by other firms and have more 
incentives to put more efforts to establish their own hypotheses and may engage searching for 
conflicting evidence with the certified opinion if they believe the firm was previously poorly 
audited (Orin, 2008). Therefore, the following research question is posed – Research Question 2: 
Would audit judgments be more objective and independent under firm rotation than under partner-
only or staff rotation arrangement? (see Figure 1 and Table 1) 
Motivated Reasoning Bias  
Traditional economic theories assume that decision makers rationally process information to be 
able to make optimal opinions, unaffected by what people prefer to believe in (e.g., Ferraro, 
Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005). Prior social science research on the impact of motivated reasoning and 
self-serving bias suggests that individual references can indeed influence the processing of 
information and thus their final decisions. In particular, human beings tend to concentrate on 
evidence that support the conclusion they favor (Ditto, Munro, Apanovitch, Scepansky, & 
Lockhart, 2003; Kunda, 1990) and provide conflicting evidence to additional cynical scrutiny 
(Gilovich, 1991). Furthermore, academic literature on motivated reasoning supports the notion that 
individuals’ goals influence their decision process and judgments (Kunda, 1990; 1999).  
Extensive research in accounting field also finds evidence of motivated reasoning bias and its 
influence among auditors, investors, tax professionals, and others. For example, audit seniors tend 
to select client-preferred techniques and attempt to exploit existing ambiguity in financial 
accounting standards to justify the utilization of those techniques (Hackenbrack & Nelson, 1996). 
Thus, experienced auditors incline to make inventory write-down recommendations in order to 
accommodate stated client preferences (Haynes, Jenkins, & Nutt, 1998). Hales (2007) also states 
that directional preferences directly impact how information is processed by individual investors. 
More specifically, investors are motivated to unconditionally agree with information suggesting 
that they might make money on their investment. Cloyd and Spilker (1999) reveals that tax 
professionals’ information searches emphasized cases with conclusions consistent with the clients’ 
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 desired outcome over cases conflicting with the clients’ desired outcome. Most pertinent to the 
interest of this study, Bazerman et al. (1997) argue that auditors suffer from an unconscious self-
serving bias and thus cannot conduct impartial audits (also see Moore et al., 2006). The bias results 
from auditors repeated close interactions with the clients’ management and their limited and distant 
interactions with investors. As argued, unconscious bias is particularly problematic as economic 
sanctions are less likely to ameliorate it. 
Moore et al. (2006) were the first to provide a possible solution to counteract motivated reasoning 
bias. More specifically, they argue that an audit firm’s pressure to keep the clients is a starting 
point of conflict of interest. Thus, they advocate fixing the hiring of audit firm to a certain period, 
that is, firm rotation with a fixed-period contract. In other words, audit firm will be hired for a 
certain period followed by a mandatory audit firm rotation. Although some raise concerns 
associated with this arrangement, such as less competition (Arel, Brody, & Pany, 2005), still this 
audit rotation policy has the potential to directly address the concerns resulting from the influence 
of audit clients. In line with the ideas offered by Moore et al. (2006), the third research question is 
as follows – Research Question 3: Would audit judgments be more objective and independent 
under firm rotation with a fixed-period contract arrangement than under the other three 
arrangements? (see Figure 1 and Table 1) 
Drawing upon a prior study (Kadous et al., 2003), future research can use goal commitment as an 
indicator of motivation since it is measured by a refined and validated scale by Klein, Wesson, 
Hollenbeck, Wright, and DeShon (2001). The Klein et al. (2001) scale requires participants to 
indicate their level of agreement with five items for each goal on five-point Likert scales. The five 
items are: “a) I think this is a good goal to shoot for; b) I am strongly committed to pursuing this 
goal; c) It is hard to take this goal seriously; d) Quite frankly, I don’t care if I achieve this goal or 
not; and e) It would not have taken much to make me abandon this goal” (Klein et al., 2001, p. 
34). Utilizing this scale, future research could answer the following question – Research Question 
4: Would auditor bonded with a fixed-period contract devote less goal commitment than auditors 
under the other three arrangements? (see Figure 1 and Table 1) 
Conclusions, Limitations, and Implications 
In general, prior studies (AICPA Cohen Commission, 1978; Orin, 2008; U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 2003; U.S. Senate, 1976; Zeff, 2003) identified various audit rotation initiatives. However, 
to date, not a single framework is available in the current literature that can help us categorize the 
fundamental differences between those alternatives and highlight clearly identifiable advantages 
and disadvantages. The current study fills this void in the literature by providing a two-dimensional 
framework for future researchers to present and test their hypotheses about the efficacy of each 
audit rotation possibility. When positioning each audit arrangement according to the two 
dimensions, the research implications of the framework suggest that auditing staff working under 
the current partner-only rotation arrangement, who use their own prior working papers in repeat 
engagements, are susceptible to both confirmation bias and motivated reasoning bias in the 
following years of audit. Staff rotation arrangement lessens but does not eliminate the influence of 
confirmation bias when subsequent auditors inherit working papers from their peer auditors within 
the same firm. In contrast, auditors under firm rotation arrangement, who are less affected by 
confirmation bias, make increasingly objective judgments, albeit with the existence of motivated 
reasoning bias. Fix-period audit arrangement can further alleviate the effect of motivated reasoning 
bias. As a result, firm rotation coupled with a fixed-period contract, by muting both cognitive bias 
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 and motivated reasoning bias, can potentially produce the most objective and independent audit 
opinions.  
Our study should be of interest to researchers as they can examine the proposed research questions 
as identified in the study. Audit simulations, analytical theory (models), and experimental research 
methods are all well suited to provide insight and empirical evidence about the potential 
institutional changes. Further, researchers can also propose additional dimensions to the current 
framework or add other audit rotation variations based on the two dimensions presented in this 
study. For example, other important impacts of extended audit rotation that merit future research 
include implementation cost, audit quality, audit fees, economic power, and limited choice of audit 
firms (Arel et al., 2005; George, 2004; Nelson, 2006). These considerations are equally critical 
when it comes to evaluating the practical implications of rotation policies. 
This study contributes to the international debate over the potential consequences of different audit 
rotation alternatives. The framework provided in this study enables regulators to form expectations 
on the relative efficacies of different rotation initiatives. This study might also be of interest to 
regulators who want to establish effective auditing procedures to promote skeptical attitude 
towards prior year working paper. According to psychology research, for bias correction, people 
should be motivated and be able to search for potential biases, the source of bias, and have or 
generate a theory regarding the direction and magnitude of the bias (Petty & Wegener, 1993; 
Wegener & Petty, 1995; 1997).  
This study has certain limitations. First, given that the current study focuses on cognitive and 
motivated reasoning biases, by not examining other factors, the net effect of various rotations 
remains uncertain. In addition, issues related to the cost-and-benefit evaluation are not addressed 
in this investigation but are significant for the decision-making process necessitating a final switch 
from the current partner-only rotation. In a letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) on January 9, 2003, AICPA pointed out that it recognized the importance of a fresh set of 
eyes but maintained that the benefit must be balanced with the cost of continuity and institutional 
knowledge (AICPA, 2003). Not surprisingly, for example, some studies argue that firm rotation 
may result in uneven audit quality across the rotation period, higher audit fees as a result of less 
competition (Arel et al., 2005), and decreased likelihood for management and auditors to openly 
communicate with each other (Nelson, 2006).  
Second, the current study did not discuss the role of reviewer that would come into play in the 
correction of confirmation bias. Review awareness can raise the reviewee’s vigilance and also 
reduce the consistency effect from prior audit involvement (Tan, 1995). Moreover, with the 
dynamic nature of staffing in public accounting firms, the changing reviewers may also help reduce 
the influence of confirmation bias even if the staff auditors are in repeat engagement.  
Third, the answers to the research questions presented in the current model might be varied 
depending on other personal, task, and environmental factors. For example, studies have shown 
that experience and training can affect the reasoning and hypothesis development (for a review, 
see Klayman, 1995). Likewise, Smith and Kida (1991) conducted a meta-analysis of studies of 
various cognitive biases among professional auditors and found that confirmation biases were 
absent when experienced auditors were given problems of a sort that they solved frequently while 
biases reappeared when the auditors were presented with problems from domains in which they 
had little practice. Future research can investigate additional factors that might moderate the 
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 relationship between a given audit rotation arrangement and professional objectiveness and 
independence. 
Fourth, with respect to firm rotation, we did not address the possibility of new firm contacting 
prior audit firm to gain information about the new client. Furthermore, reaching out to the 
predecessor audit firm might create an expectation as a result, especially when the successor audit 
firm puts trust on the work done by the preceding firm. This will annul the intended benefit of firm 
rotation arrangement.  
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